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The literature on vertical product di⁄erentiation often makes the assumption that any
one ￿rm can produce only one product. Although this is analytically convenient, in
reality, ￿rms normally produce and sell multiple di⁄erentiated products. However,
a causal survey of the evidence suggests that, in some industries, product qualities
are sometimes entangled and keen competition takes place between ￿rms that deal in
similar qualities. In other industries, product qualities are segmented and competition
is relaxed. In this paper, we focus on the segmented market structure in a duopoly
where there are high-quality and low-quality multiproduct ￿rms.
For example, in the microprocessor market, Intel produces various models of the
Core 2 Duo, including the E8500, E8400, E8200, and E6850, while AMD produces
the Athlon 64 X2 product line, which includes models such as the 7850, 7750, and
7550. Because the quality of Intel￿ s line is higher, the market is vertically segmented.
Similarly, in the automobile industry, BMW and Mercedes-Benz both sell three classes
of sedans. The sedans produced by BMW and Mercedes-Benz are of a higher quality
than those o⁄ered by Ford.
Although, in reality, vertically di⁄erentiated product markets are usually multi-
product oligopolies, this reality has not been studied well in related literature; this is
probably because this model is far more di¢ cult to analyze.1 As Chambers, Kouvelis,
and Semple [2006] noted, it is important to pay attention to the assumed unit costs
of quality improvement and market coverage when analyzing vertically di⁄erentiated
product competition; this is because these play a crucial role in the market outcome.
The literature on two-stage competition in a vertical di⁄erentiated industry of-
ten makes the assumption that unit costs of quality improvement are zero, linear, or
quadratic despite the fact that there is no apparent reason for making this assumption.
Our model identi￿es the factors that in￿ uence whether ￿rms will produce single or
1Notable exceptions are Katz [1984] and Gilbert and Matutes [1993] and Champsaur and Rochet
[1989, 1990].
1multiple products; we do this by looking into the second derivative of the cost func-
tion. We reveal that when the unit cost is concave, each ￿rm produces a single quality.
Since our purpose is to investigate multiproduct ￿rms, we assume strictly convex cost
functions. For analytical tractability, we specify that unit costs of quality improve-
ment are quadratic, just as Champsaur and Rochet [1989] and Motta [1993] do, among
others. While Champsaur and Rochet [1990, Proposition 2] found that a two-stage
competition in a vertical di⁄erentiated industry produces a single product duopoly,
we ￿nd that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) exists, such that each ￿rm
produces an interval of products.
In terms of market coverage, all consumers are to be served if consumers￿willingness
to pay for quality is not heterogeneous. If consumer taste is su¢ ciently heterogeneous,
then there is no incentive for ￿rms to serve those consumers who are less willing to
pay for quality and thus cover the entire market. Therefore, market coverage depends
on the distribution of consumers￿willingness to pay. Nevertheless, previous studies,
including Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990], have often assumed that ￿rms must
cover the entire market and serve all consumers.
It is known that a monopolist does not cover the whole market even if costs of
quality improvement are zero (Mussa and Rosen [1978]; Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton
and Thisse [1986]). He o⁄ers an interval of qualities but only for consumers with high
willingness-to-pay. Extending their models to duopoly, Champsaur and Rochet [1989,
1990] and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006] show that each ￿rm produces a sin-
gle quality rather than a range of qualities under the similar set-up: the quasilinear
utility, the uniform distribution of consumer taste, and the quadratic cost of quality
improvement. We will show that the single-product outcome is attributed to full mar-
ket coverage whereas the multiproduct outcome is ascribed to partial market coverage.
This suggests that market coverage plays an important role for emergence of multi-
product ￿rms. If the market is not assumed to be fully covered, ￿rms would produce
more distinct qualities to segment the market. Then, more consumers would make a
2purchase and thus the size of market would be enlarged.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine market segmentation by multi-
product duopolists in a vertically di⁄erentiated market and to characterize SPNE and
the level of social welfare on the basis of the common assumptions made by Champsaur
and Rochet [1989, 1990]. While we use Champsaur and Rochet￿ s work and conclusions
as a starting point, our model di⁄ers from them in that the ￿rms in our market do
not have to cover the entire market. We show that an uncovered market equilibrium
is very di⁄erent from a covered one.
In this paper, we examine a two-stage competition in a vertically di⁄erentiated
industry, where each ￿rm provides a number of products with similar qualities. Each
duopolist simultaneously chooses the number of products and qualities of its products
in the ￿rst stage, and then competes in terms of price in the second stage. The market
coverage is endogenously determined in the duopolistic competition.
Previewing our other results, we show that the low-quality ￿rm produces a wider
range of qualities, serves more consumers, and earns lower pro￿ts than the high-quality
￿rm. This is because the unit pro￿t obtained by the high-quality product is much
higher. We also show that the multiproduct duopolists face a so-called prisoner￿ s
dilemma. Their pro￿ts go down by o⁄ering too many qualities, although the consumer
surplus and the social welfare are higher because of the keen competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the model and
examines the second-stage price equilibrium. Section III investigates the ￿rst-stage
quality interval equilibrium and characterizes the SPNE under the quadratic cost of
quality improvement. We show that each ￿rm produces an interval of qualities rather
than a single quality when consumer preference is su¢ ciently heterogeneous. Section
IV considers the welfare implications by computing the consumer surplus and the social
welfare. Section V outlines the conclusions that can be made on the back of this model.
3II. The Model
There are two ￿rms, A and B, which have identical production technology in terms of
their quality improvement. Each ￿rm produces a number of products with similar qual-
ities. The products of ￿rm A are indexed as 1;2;:::;na, and their qualities are indexed
as q1;q2;:::;qna; the products of ￿rm B are indexed as na+1;na+2;:::;na+nb, and their
qualities are indexed as qna+1;qna+2;:::;qna+nb, where qi > qi+1 for i = 1;2;:::;na+nb￿1
so that both ￿rms o⁄er a connected range of qualities.2 In addition, the associated
prices of these quality-di⁄erentiated goods are denoted by p1;p2;:::;pna+nb, respectively.
There is a continuum of consumers, each of whom has a di⁄erent taste for quality.
Their willingness to pay for quality is distributed uniformly over the interval [￿;￿ ￿] and
the density is normalized to 1. Each consumer purchases one unit of the product either
from ￿rm A or B, or does not purchase at all. Following Tirole [1988], we assume the





￿qi ￿ pi if she purchases quality qi at price pi
0 otherwise
This utility implies that all consumers unanimously prefer a higher quality at a given
price and that consumers with higher ￿ will pay more for a higher quality.
Consumer demand is determined as follows: Marginal consumers, indexed by ￿i,
are indi⁄erent as to whether they will purchase quality qi at price pi or quality qi+1 at













for i = na + nb
Thus, any consumer with an index greater than ￿i will prefer qi to qi+1 for all i =
1;:::;na+nb￿1, and any consumer with an index of less than pna+nb=qna+nb will prefer
2We exclude entangled con￿gurations. For example, if ￿rm A produces two qualities￿ q1 and q3￿ and
￿rm B produces q2 and q4, then the ￿rst-order conditions in the ￿rst-stage quality subgame are given
by four polynomials of degree 11 with four variables q1, q2, q3, and q4, which are far from analytically
tractable.
4not to buy at all than to buy qna+nb. Previous studies (Champsaur and Rochet [1989,
1990]; Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006]) tend to assume that ￿na+nb = ￿ rather
than the second line of (1). ￿na+nb = ￿ means that the whole market would be covered.
However, there is no reason for ￿rm B to serve consumers ￿ whose willingness to pay
for unit quality is the lowest; this is because ￿rms can select the range of qualities in the
free world. We therefore assume that the market coverage is endogenously determined
by the market fundamentals, which are given by ￿ and ￿ ￿.





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 for i = 1
￿i￿1 ￿ ￿i for i = 2;:::;na + nb
Following Tirole [1988], we assume that the production activities are fully additive;
this means that the unit cost of quality improvement is independent of its quantities
and dependent on quality. Furthermore, as Moorthy [1988], Champsaur and Rochet
[1989], and Champers, Chambers, Kouvelis, and Semple [2006] do, we assume that the
cost of quality is associated with the variable cost rather than ￿xed production cost.








where c(qi) is the unit cost of quality improvement.3
Assumption 1 The unit cost of quality improvement is strictly convex.
Assumption 1 indicates that the marginal quality improvements become increas-
ingly costly. This is also assumed by Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Champsaur and
Rochet [1989, 1990] in their models, among others, whereas Choi and Shin [1992] and
Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006] assume that quality improvement incurs linear
3Unlike Motta [1993], we disregard the ￿xed cost of quality improvement because ￿rms are very
unlikely to o⁄er multiple qualities in the presence of ￿xed costs.
5costs. Because the utility is of the form u = ￿qi, the willingness to pay for a unit
quality is constant. When the unit costs of quality improvement are concave, then the
higher the quality is, the lower the marginal cost of improving a unit quality will be.
Therefore, ￿rms are incentivized to sell qualities at a price that is as high as possible;
this implies that they have no reason to o⁄er goods of a lower quality and segment the
market, as shown in Appendix 1. Because there are very few single product ￿rms in
the real world, we should not assume the concave cost of quality improvement. On the
contrary, if the unit costs of quality improvement are convex, then the marginal cost
of a lower quality will be lower while the willingness to pay for a quality will remain
constant. This may enable ￿rms to o⁄er multiple products and segment the market.
Assumption 2 The lower bound ￿ of the consumer distribution is su¢ ciently small.
The lower bound ￿ is so small that it is less than the equilibriumvalue of pna+nb=qna+nb,
which implies that the market is never fully covered. The uncovered market is also as-
sumed by Choi and Shin [1992] and Motta [1993], among others. If this assumption
is found not to be the case, then the whole market may be covered. However, there
is another possible situation between the two, which is called the ￿corner solution￿ ; in
this situation, the price of the lowest quality is set such that the consumer with the
lowest ￿ = ￿ will be indi⁄erent as to whether or not they will buy the lowest quality.
When ￿ is not su¢ ciently small, there will be three possible strategies that ￿rm B,
who produces the lowest quality qna+nb in the second line of (1), can adopt. These
strategies are as follows: (i) to uncover the market ￿na+nb = pna+nb=qna+nb for large
￿ ￿=￿, (ii) to use the ￿corner solution￿￿na+nb = ￿ = pna+nb=qna+nb for intermediate ￿ ￿=￿,
and (iii) to cover the market ￿na+nb = ￿ for small ￿ ￿=￿.4
4Such a ￿corner solution￿ arises in an oligopoly, but not in a monopoly. In fact, Gabszewicz,
Shaked, Sutton and Thisse [1986] show that a multiproduct monopolist will segment the market by
o⁄ering the maximum number of qualities permitted when ￿ ￿=￿ is below a threshold, and that he will
only o⁄er the top quality product when ￿ ￿=￿ is above the threshold. The former corresponds to (i)
uncovering the market and the latter (iii) covering the market.
6Even if we do not allow ￿rms to o⁄er multiple products in the model, any analysis
of SPNE will be very complicated (Wauthy [1996]; Liao [2008]). All three cases have
to be checked to ensure that each ￿rm has no incentive to deviate to an arbitrary
number of qualities; this makes the process more complicated. This is why we assume
Assumption 2.
In our model, the two ￿rms play a two-stage game under these two assumptions.
In the ￿rst stage, they simultaneously choose the number of products and the qualities
of their products. In the second stage, they simultaneously select the prices of their
products, having observed the number of products and their qualities. Using backward
induction, we ￿rst solve the ￿rst-order conditions for prices in the second stage. From
this, the following lemma is obtained; the proof can be found in Appendix 2.
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for i = 1;2;:::;na ￿ 1
2qac(qa)+qac(qb)+2qa(qa￿qb)￿ ￿
4qa￿qb ￿ p￿
a for i = na
qbc(qa)+2qbc(qb)+qb(qa￿qb)￿ ￿
4qa￿qb ￿ p￿




4qa￿qb g for i = na + 2;:::;na + nb
where brands qa ￿ qna and qb ￿ qna+1 are in direct competition.











0 (qi) + ￿ ￿
￿
for all i 6= na;na+1 from (1) and (3). This corresponds to equation (17) in Mussa and
Rosen [1978], where a monopolist perfectly discriminates consumers by equalizing the
marginal revenue and cost of increments of quality improvement.
Since Assumption 2 presumes an uncovered market, the second-stage price sub-
game is uniquely determined for any qualities with an arbitrary number by Lemma 1.
Therefore, we can safely focus on the ￿rst-stage quality competition.
7III. Quadratic Cost of Quality Improvement
From Assumption 1, we consider a strictly convex unit cost of quality improvement.
More speci￿cally, we set a quadratic form c(qi) = q2
i=2 for mathematical tractability as
Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990], Motta [1993], among others.5
Champsaur and Rochet [1990] assume an exogenously covered market, whereas our
model assumes an endogenously uncovered market, on the basis of Assumption 2. As a
result, Champsaur and Rochet [1990, Proposition 2] show that each ￿rm o⁄ers a single
quality, whereas we show below that each ￿rm o⁄ers an interval of qualities in SPNE.
Substituting the second-stage equilibrium prices (3) into the pro￿ts (2), we have
the equilibrium pro￿ts, ￿￿
a and ￿￿
b, as functions of q1;q2;:::;qna+nb. The ￿rst-order





























a(na + 1;nb;q(na + 1);q(nb)) ￿ ￿
￿





b(na;nb + 1;q(na);q(nb + 1)) ￿ ￿
￿
b(na;nb;q(na);q(nb)) = 0 (12)
where q(na) ￿ (q1(na);:::;qna￿1(na);qa(na)) is the optimal quality line produced by
￿rm A given na, nb and qb(nb) and q(nb) ￿ (qb(nb);qna+2(nb);:::;qna+nb(nb)) is the
optimal quality line by ￿rm B given na, nb and qa(na). We compute the equilibrium
values in three steps.
5Under di⁄erent convex costs of quality improvement, most of the results do not di⁄er much
qualitatively, according to our numerical analysis.








2na￿1 for i = 1;:::;na ￿ 1
na+nb+1￿i
nb qb for i = na + 2;:::;na + nb
From (13), we can readily show that q￿
i￿1 ￿ q￿
i is constant for all qualities except for
￿ghting brands q￿
a and q￿
b. Note that a multiproduct monopolist also sets q￿
i￿1 ￿ q￿
i
as a constant in his optimal quality decision (Mussa and Rosen [1978]).6 Therefore,
monopoly and duopoly give the same results for all brands except for ￿ghting brands
q￿
a and q￿
b; this situation, of course, does not exist in a monopoly.
Step 2. Plugging (13) into the pro￿ts, we obtain
(14)
￿￿











The positive increments of pro￿ts in (14) indicate that each ￿rm has an incentive to
increase the number of qualities holding the quality of its ￿ghting brand unchanged.
Furthermore, qa(na + 1) is the optimal quality of A￿ s ￿ghting brand given na + 1, nb
and qb(nb), and qb(nb +1) is the optimal quality of B￿ s ￿ghting brand given na, nb +1
and qa(na) by de￿nition. Therefore, we necessarily have
(15)
￿￿
a(na + 1;nb;qa(na + 1);qb(nb)) ￿ ￿￿
a(na + 1;nb;qa(na);qb(nb))
￿￿
b(na;nb + 1;qa(na);qb(nb + 1)) ￿ ￿￿
b(na;nb + 1;qa(na);qb(nb))
Putting (14) and (15) together, we get ￿￿￿
a > 0 and ￿￿￿
b > 0, which implies that
n￿
a;n￿
b ! 1. Stated di⁄erently, each ￿rm produces an interval of qualities rather
than a ￿nite number of products. Therefore, each ￿rm chooses to o⁄er an interval of
qualities although they can reduce the number of similar qualities arbitrarily.
Step 3. Substituting (13) into (7) and (8), and taking the limit of na;nb ! 1, we
can reduce to


















6The constant property does not hold both in a monopoly and in a duopoly if consumers￿taste for


























a ￿ 11qaqb + q
2
b
￿￿ ￿ + 16q
2
a (4qa ￿ 7qb)￿ ￿
2
= 0
In order to solve the simultaneous equations fA = fB = 0, by using the Buchberger￿ s
algorithm (Cox, Little and O￿ Shea [1997]) we compute the Gr￿bner bases, one of which
is the 12th-order polynomial of qb. We can then readily veri￿ed that there exists a
unique solution of qb in the interval of (0;￿ ￿). Plugging it into fA = 0 gives us
q
￿
a = 0:779￿ ￿ ; q
￿
b = 0:418￿ ￿
The second-order conditions for pro￿t maximization are shown to be satis￿ed. Fur-








Accordingly, we have obtained a unique candidate for SPNE. The fact that it is a
unique SPNE is clearly demonstrated in the two-stage game as follows; the proof is
contained in Appendix 3.




















Proposition 1 presents the main result of our model: there is a multi-quality equi-
librium where each duopolist produces an interval of qualities. This result contrasts
sharply with the single-quality outcome outlined in Champsaur and Rochet [1989,
Proposition 3; 1990, Proposition 2], where the market is assumed to be covered exoge-
nously. In this case, all consumers have a su¢ ciently low reservation utility (￿ ￿ 0);
10this implies that all consumers will make a purchase, that is, the demand is not elastic.
Given the ￿xed market size, the negative e⁄ect of cannibalization dominates the posi-
tive e⁄ect of segmentation. This functions in much the same way as Hotelling￿ s [1929]
spatial competition; hence, each ￿rm has no incentive to provide multiple products.
On the contrary, when the market is not covered, the demand is more elastic be-
cause consumers with high reservation utility do not tend to purchase any products.
In this case, ￿rms are likely to segment and enlarge the market by o⁄ering multiple
products. Thus, in the uncovered market, the positive e⁄ect of segmentation outweighs
the negative e⁄ect of cannibalization.
According to Proposition 1, no ￿rms produce intermediate qualities between 0:418￿ ￿
and 0:779￿ ￿, despite the fact that this interval is at the center of quality distribution. It
is therefore in the interest of each ￿rm to leave a gap between two product lines in order
to relax the price competition at an SPNE. This is clearly an example of Champsaur
and Rochet￿ s [1989] Proposition 5.
From Proposition 1 and the equilibrium prices (3), the intervals of served consumers










= [0:708￿ ￿;￿ ￿]














= [0:262￿ ￿;0:708￿ ￿]
where all the prices and qualities are evaluated at na;nb ! 1. It should be noted that
the market is uncovered, since consumers in the range of [0;0:262￿ ￿] are not served. By
combining Proposition 1 with the above results, we can say that the low-quality ￿rm
provides a wider quality range and serves more consumers than the high-quality ￿rm.
Because the market is uncovered, the low-quality ￿rm wants to attract consumers who
originally did not make a purchase. This is done by expanding the product line to
lower qualities and selling them for lower prices. As a result, the low-quality ￿rm o⁄ers
a wider quality interval and serves more customers.
11In the market of home video game consoles, Nintendo introduced Wii and Sony
introduced PlayStation 3 in similar period.7 As compared to Wii, PlayStation has
robust multimedia capabilities and a high-de￿nition optical disc format, Blu-ray Disc,
which target at professional players. PlayStation is thus sold at higher prices than Wii,
and its market share is smaller than Wii (the market shares of PlayStation and Wii in
2009 are 26% and 50%, respectively).
The uncovered range [0;0:262￿ ￿] here is narrower than that in a single-product
duopoly ([0;0:376￿ ￿] in Motta [1993]) or a monopoly ([0;0:5￿ ￿] in Mussa and Rosen
[1978]). This is because the interval competition here is keener than in the others.


































































0 ￿ ￿ ￿. The second and third lines in (16) are the pro￿ts of ￿ghting brands, q￿
a
and q￿
b, respectively. The ￿ghting brands imperfectly price discriminate consumers by
￿bunching￿consumers with di⁄erent tastes for the same quality. On the other hand,





b), respectively.8 Because they are independent of the strategy of the other
￿rm, each ￿rms acts as a local monopolist and extracts consumers￿surplus by o⁄ering
a range of qualities with perfect price discrimination. This is done by equalizing the
marginal revenue and cost of increments of quality improvement given by (4).
7Note that although Nintendo and Sony provide one model of game consoles rather than mul-
tiple models in each period, their retailers often bundle the console with its accessories in several
combinations.
8The second and third lines in (16) are called pure di⁄erentiation pro￿ts and the ￿rst and last lines
in (16) are called pure segmentation pro￿ts by Champsaur and Rochet [1989].











The higher-quality ￿rm A is more pro￿table than the lower-quality ￿rm B although
the higher-quality ￿rm provides a narrower quality range and serves less consumers.
Intuitively, this is because a higher-quality product is purchased by consumers with
higher willingness to pay for a unit quality (i.e., higher ￿).







). Hence, we establish the following:
Proposition 2 The pro￿t of each ￿rm in a multiproduct duopoly is lower than that in
a single-product duopoly.
As the above breakdown shows, when ￿rms are allowed to produce as many qualities
as they like, they tend to o⁄er an interval of qualities rather than a ￿nite number of
products. However, Proposition 2 shows that the pro￿t of each ￿rm gets lower. This
exempli￿es the prisoner￿ s dilemma.
Note however that Proposition 2 does not hold for monopoly. When a monopolist
is allowed to produce an arbitrary number of qualities, he o⁄ers a quality range of
q￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿] and serves consumers only in the range of ￿
￿ 2 [0:5￿ ￿;￿ ￿] (Mussa and Rosen,
[1978]). On the other hand, if ￿ is not small and exceeds 0:5￿ ￿, then the optimal policy
for the monopolist is to provide a single quality q￿
1 = 0:667￿ ￿, served consumers are
￿
￿ 2 [0:667￿ ￿;￿ ￿]. The former pro￿t of multiproduct monopoly is calculated as 0:0833￿
3
,
which is higher than that of single-product monopoly given by 0:0741￿
3
. This is because
in the absence of competition the monopolist does not fall into the prisoner￿ s dilemma,
but exploits the consumer surplus by o⁄ering a range of qualities.
Although the high-quality ￿rm A produces a narrower quality range and serves fewer
consumers, the pro￿t of each quality of ￿rm A is always higher than that of ￿rm B
according to (16). Because ￿rm A earns the higher aggregate pro￿t, the negative e⁄ect
13of the narrower range is overwhelmed by the positive e⁄ect of the higher willingness to
pay for higher qualities. The same results are obtained in the case of the single-product
duopoly.
IV. Social Welfare
In this section, we look into the socially optimal production of qualities. The utility
function
U (￿;q) = maxf￿q ￿ p;0g
is quasilinear and transferable. The social welfare is therefore de￿ned by
W ￿ S + ￿a + ￿b
















As a benchmark, let us ￿rst consider ￿rst the socially optimum, that is, the ￿rst-
best assignment. As shown by Moorthy [1984], the social planner sets each price equal
to each marginal cost po
i = c(qi), assigns the quality range qo 2 limna;nb!1[q1;qna+nb] =
[0;￿ ￿], and serves all consumers ￿
o 2 (￿;￿ ￿). Since the pro￿ts are zero, the social welfare







Next, consider the interval competition in a duopoly. Straightforward calculations
yield S￿ = 0:1004￿
3
. Hence, the social welfare in the interval competition is calculated
by
W




14On the other hand, in the single-product competition, the social welfare as the sum
of the consumer surplus and the pro￿ts of ￿rms A and B is calculated by
W




Comparing the two values, we can say the following:
Proposition 3 When ￿rms are allowed to o⁄er an arbitrary number of qualities, both
the consumer surplus and the social welfare are high in comparison to the single-quality
duopoly.
It is clear that the consumer surplus is higher in the interval competition although
the pro￿t of each multiproduct ￿rm is lower because of the prisoner￿ s dilemma shown
in Proposition 2. Thus, Proposition 3 indicates that the positive e⁄ect on the consumer
surplus is greater than the negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts.
Finally, we have somewhat similar results in the case of monopoly. When a monop-
olist is allowed to produce a range of qualities, he o⁄ers a quality range of q￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿]
and serves consumers in the range of ￿
￿ 2 [0:5￿ ￿;￿ ￿]. The social welfare as the sum of
the consumer surplus and the pro￿t is calculated by
W




In comparison with a duopoly situation, consumers are less well o⁄ when the ￿rm is
better o⁄. That is because multiproduct monopolists are able to exploit the consumer
surplus more e⁄ectively than the multiproduct duopolists. However, for society as a
whole, a monopoly is worse than a duopoly because of the absence of competition.
In the case of single-product monopoly under ￿ < 0:5￿ ￿, the monopolist provides the
single quality q￿
1 = 0:667￿ ￿ and serves consumers ￿
￿ 2 [0:667￿ ￿;￿ ￿]. The social welfare as
the sum of the consumer surplus and pro￿t is
W




Thus, the single-product monopoly is shown to be in the worst interest for both con-
sumers and the monopolist.
15V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a two-stage competition between multiproduct duopolists
in which the ￿rms compete in terms of the number of similar products and their qual-
ities and then compete in terms of prices. We have clari￿ed that the emergence of a
multiproduct equilibrium crucially depends on the nature of quality improvement costs
and the nature of the endogenous market coverage.
First, we showed that each ￿rm must produce a single quality for any concave cost
of quality improvement. This ￿nding may justify the assumption of single-product
￿rms under linear or zero costs of quality improvement. However, because, in reality,
￿rms often o⁄er multiple products, the linear or zero cost assumptions may be inappro-
priate in examining oligopolies in vertical product di⁄erentiation. Second, we focused
on the strictly convex, that is, quadratic cost of quality improvement and showed that
each ￿rm chooses to o⁄er an interval of qualities when the market is uncovered. This
outcome is in sharp contrast with that in an exogenously covered market obtained in
Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990]. Third, we showed that the low-quality ￿rm pro-
duces a wider range of qualities and serves more consumers than the high-quality ￿rm
although the low-quality ￿rm generates less pro￿t. Finally, we veri￿ed the prisoner￿ s
dilemma: the pro￿ts of multiproduct duopolists are smaller than those of single-product
duopolists. However, the former yields higher consumer surplus and higher social wel-
fare as a result of inter￿rm competition. These ￿ndings contrast sharply with most of
the current literature on the product di⁄erentiation, and may provide an explanation
for the characteristics of the segmented market structures in the real world.
Our results were obtained using a speci￿c model that made several assumptions on
consumer preference and production technology; these assumptions are common in the
literature on vertical product di⁄erentiation. One drawback of our model is that each
￿rm is assumed to produce segmented qualities. However, qualities are not necessarily
segmented; indeed, they are often entangled between ￿rms in the real world.
16Appendix 1: Concave Cost of Quality Improvement
Proposition 4 If the unit cost of quality improvement is concave, each ￿rm o⁄ers a
single quality.
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for i = na + 1;:::;na + nb ￿ 1























































> 0 () ￿ ￿
c(q1) ￿ c(q2)
q1 ￿ q2





That is, the top quality goes to in￿nity.9
9In order to avoid in￿nite quality, Choi and Shin [1992] and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006]
assume an upper bound of qi. However, assuming an upper bound should alter the assumption on the
unit cost of quality improvement as follows
c0 (qi) ￿ 0, c00 (qi) ￿ 0 for qi ￿ q
c(qi) is suddenly very large for qi > q
This means that c(qi) is no more concave.
17From (17), the demand for intermediate quality i (= 2;3;:::;na ￿1;na +2;:::;na +
nb ￿ 1) is given by


























Because the ￿rst term is the slope between points (qi￿1;c(qi￿1)) and (qi;c(qi)) and
the second term is that between (qi;c(qi)) and (qi+1;c(qi+1)), their di⁄erence is non-
positive for any concave c(qi) with qi￿1 > qi > qi+1.











for any concave c(qi). Hence, we have shown that ￿rm A produces at most two qualities
and ￿rm B at most one quality qb.
It remains to show that (na;nb) = (2;1) is not an SPNE. When (na;nb) = (2;1),
￿rm A optimizes q1 and q2 (= qa). Since @￿￿
a=@q1 > 0, q￿
1 is the maximum quality,
which is denoted by q. Let q2 = rq and q3 = sq, where 0 < s < r < 1. Then, the other












2 + ￿2(r;s)c(q)q + ￿3(r;s)c(q)c
0 (q)q + ￿4(r;s)c
0 (q)q
2
and ￿i(r;s) are constants.
From concavity of c(q), the degree of C(q) is does not exceed two. When the degree











18Therefore, we have q2 ! q, which implies single-product outcome. When the degree is






s2(20r + s)(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)2
4(4r ￿ s)
3 > 0
Hence, we have therefore shown that the multiproduct duopoly setting ends up with
the single-product duopoly.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 1
The ￿rst-order conditions are readily computed as11
@￿a
@p1
= ￿ ￿ ￿
2p1 ￿ 2p2 ￿ c(q1) + c(q2)
q1 ￿ q2




2pi￿1 ￿ 2pi ￿ c(qi￿1) + c(qi)
qi￿1 ￿ qi
￿
2pi ￿ 2pi+1 ￿ c(qi) + c(qi+1)
qi ￿ qi+1




2pna￿1 ￿ 2pna ￿ c(qna￿1) + c(qna)
qna￿1 ￿ qna
￿
2pna ￿ pna+1 ￿ c(qna)
qna ￿ qna+1




pna ￿ 2pna+1 + c(qna+1)
qna ￿ qna+1
￿
2pna+1 ￿ 2pna+2 ￿ c(qna+1) + c(qna+2)
qna+1 ￿ qna+2




2pi￿1 ￿ 2pi ￿ c(qi￿1) + c(qi)
qi￿1 ￿ qi
￿
2pi ￿ 2pi+1 ￿ c(qi) + c(qi+1)
qi ￿ qi+1









= 0 for i = na + nb
where the second and the ￿fth equations are ignored when na = 2 and nb = 2.
From @￿a=@pi = 0 (i = 1;:::;na ￿ 1), p2;:::;pna can be successively expressed as
a function of p1:




c(q1) ￿ c(qna) + (q1 ￿ qna)￿ ￿
￿











2 = q and q￿
3 = 4q=7. This is shown by Choi and Shin [1992] assuming single-product
duopoly.
11If na = 2 and nb = 2, the second and the ￿fth equations in the following are ignored.
19From @￿b=@pi = 0 (i = na + 2;:::;na + nb), pna+1;:::;pna+nb are successively solved










for i = na + 1;:::;na + nb ￿ 1
Plugging (19) and (20) into @￿a=@pna = @￿b=@pna+1 = 0, we obtain p￿
1 and p￿
na+nb as
functions of qi, na and nb, respectively. Substituting them into (19) and (20) yields the
equilibrium prices (3).
Because the pro￿t functions are quadratic and concave in pi, the second-order con-
ditions are satis￿ed.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
Because the unique solution given by (13) and Proposition 1 satis￿es the na + nb
￿rst-order conditions, it is su¢ cient to show that both pro￿t functions are concave
in the neighborhood of qi = q￿
i for i = 1;2;:::;na + nb. This can be con￿rmed by
computing the Jacobian matrix of each pro￿t function.







> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
￿
￿ ￿￿qa
2(2na￿1) for i = j = 1;2;:::;na ￿ 1
￿ ￿￿qa
4(2na￿1) for i = j ￿ 1 and i = 1;2;:::;na
0 for i = j ￿ 2
@fA
@qa for i = j = na
Let Ji be the determinant of the ith principal minor of the Jacobian matrix given by
(21). Suppose
(22) jJij = (2i + 1)
"
￿




holds for i = k. The following shows that it is true for k = 1;2.
jJ1j = ￿
3






















= (2k + 1)
"
￿









￿ (2k ￿ 1)
"
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ qa
￿
4(2na ￿ 1)




= [2(k + 1) + 1]
"
￿



























￿ ￿0:147￿ ￿ lim
na!1jJna￿1j
Therefore, the signs of jJnaj and jJna￿1j are opposite, and hence, jJij is negative for all
odd i and positive for all even i, verifying concavity near qi = q￿
i for i = 1;2;:::;na.
The similar proof is applied for ￿rm B.
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